The Lean Startup by Eric Ries

modified 2018/11/02

Highlights:

Loc:98 There is a mythmaking industry hard at work to sell us that story, but I have come to believe that the story is false, the product of selection bias and after-the-fact rationalization. In fact, having worked with hundreds of entrepreneurs, I have seen firsthand how often a promising start leads to failure. The grim reality is that most startups fail. Most new products are not successful. Most new ventures do not live up to their potential. Yet the story of perseverance, creative genius, and hard work persists. Why is it so popular? I think there is something deeply appealing about this modern-day rags-to-riches story. It makes success seem inevitable if you just have the right stuff. It means that the mundane details, the boring stuff, the small individual choices don’t matter. If we build it, they will come. When we fail, as so many of us do, we have a ready-made excuse: we didn’t have the right stuff. We weren’t visionary enough or weren’t in the right place at the right time.

Loc:105 have learned from both my own successes and failures and those of many others that it’s the boring stuff that matters the most. Startup success is not a consequence of good genes or being in the right place at the right time. Startup success can be engineered by following the right process, which means it can be learned, which means it can be taught.

Loc:129 Despite the volumes written on business strategy, the key attributes of business leaders, and ways to identify the next big thing, innovators still struggle to bring their ideas to life. This was the frustration that led us to try a radical new approach at IMVU, one characterized by an extremely fast cycle time, a focus on what customers want (without asking them), and a scientific approach to making decisions.

Loc:160 In the process of being called on to defend and explain my insights and with the collaboration of other writers, thinkers, and entrepreneurs, I had a chance to refine and develop the theory of the Lean Startup beyond its rudimentary beginnings. > Ideas become stronger through defending them to other people, writing alone does not get this effect

Loc:176 The five principles of the Lean Startup, which inform all three parts of this book, are as follows: 1. Entrepreneurs are everywhere. You don’t have to work in a garage to be in a startup. The concept of entrepreneurship includes anyone who works within my definition of a startup: a human institution designed to create new products and services under conditions of extreme uncertainty. That means entrepreneurs are everywhere and the Lean Startup approach can work in any size company, even a very large enterprise, in any sector or industry.

Loc:180 2. Entrepreneurship is management. A startup is an institution, not just a product, and so it requires a new kind of management specifically geared to its context of extreme uncertainty.

Loc:183 3. Validated learning. Startups exist not just to make stuff, make money, or even serve customers. They exist to learn how to build a sustainable business. This learning can be validated scientifically by running frequent experiments that allow entrepreneurs to test each element of their vision.

Loc:186 4. Build-Measure-Learn. The fundamental activity of a startup is to turn ideas into products, measure how customers respond, and then learn whether to pivot or persevere. All successful startup processes should be geared to accelerate that feedback loop.

Loc:188 5. Innovation accounting. To improve entrepreneurial outcomes and hold innovators accountable, we need to focus on the boring stuff: how to measure progress, how to set up milestones, and how to prioritize work. This requires a new kind of accounting designed for startups—and the people who hold them accountable.

Loc:246 The Lean Startup takes its name from the lean manufacturing revolution that Taiichi Ohno and Shigeo Shingo are credited with developing at Toyota. Lean thinking is radically altering the way supply chains and production systems are run. Among its tenets are drawing on the knowledge and creativity of individual workers, the shrinking of batch sizes, just-in-time production and inventory control, and an acceleration of cycle times.

Loc:251 Progress in manufacturing is measured by the production of high-quality physical goods. As we’ll see in Chapter 3, the Lean Startup uses a different unit of progress, called validated learning. With scientific learning as our yardstick, we can discover and eliminate the sources of waste that are plaguing entrepreneurship.

Loc:270 Because startups often accidentally build something nobody wants, it doesn’t matter much if they do it on time and on budget. The goal of a startup is to figure out the right thing to build—the thing customers want and will pay for—as quickly as possible. In other words, the Lean Startup is a new way of looking at the development of innovative new products that emphasizes fast iteration and customer insight, a huge vision, and great ambition, all at the same time.

Loc:293 Unfortunately, too many startup business plans look more like they are planning to launch a rocket ship than drive a car. They prescribe the steps to take and the results to expect in excruciating detail, and as in planning to launch a rocket, they are set up in such a way that even tiny errors in assumptions can lead to catastrophic outcomes.

Loc:298 When the customers failed to materialize, the company had committed itself so completely that they could not adapt in time. They had “achieved failure”—successfully, faithfully, and rigorously executing a plan that turned out to have been utterly flawed.

Loc:300 The Lean Startup method, in contrast, is designed to teach you how to drive a startup. Instead of making complex plans that are based on a lot of assumptions, you can make constant adjustments with a steering wheel called the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop. Through this process of steering, we can learn when and if it’s time to make a sharp turn called a pivot or whether we should persevere along our current path. Once we have an engine that’s revved up, the Lean Startup offers methods to scale and grow the business with maximum acceleration.

Loc:323 in general management, a failure to deliver results is due to either a failure to plan adequately or a failure to execute properly. Both are significant lapses, yet new product development in our modern economy routinely requires exactly this kind of failure on the way to greatness.

Loc:361 I’ve come to realize that the most important part of this definition is what it omits. It says nothing about size of the company, the industry, or the sector of the economy. Anyone who is creating a new product or business under conditions of extreme uncertainty is an entrepreneur whether he or she knows it or not and whether working in a government agency, a venture-backed company, a nonprofit, or a decidedly for-profit company with financial investors.

Loc:405 Usually, companies like Intuit fall into the trap described in Clayton Christensten’s The Innovator’s Dilemma: they are very good at creating incremental improvements to existing products and serving existing customers, which Christensen called sustaining innovation, but struggle to create breakthrough new products—disruptive innovation—that can create new sustainable sources of growth.

Loc:438 Now they test over five hundred different changes in a two-and-a-half-month tax season. They’re running up to seventy different tests per week. The team can make a change live on its website on Thursday, run it over the weekend, read the results on Monday, and come to conclusions starting Tuesday; then they rebuild new tests on Thursday and launch the next set on Thursday night. As Scott put it, “Boy, the amount of learning they get is just immense now. And what it does is develop entrepreneurs, because when you have only one test, you don’t have entrepreneurs, you have politicians, because you have to sell. Out of a hundred good ideas, you’ve got to sell your idea. So you build up a society of politicians and salespeople. When you have five hundred tests you’re running, then everybody’s ideas can run. And then you create entrepreneurs who run and learn and can retest and relearn as opposed to a society of politicians.

Loc:482 What if we found ourselves building something that nobody wanted? In that case what did it matter if we did it on time and on budget? When I went home at the end of a day’s work, the only things I knew for sure were that I had kept people busy and spent money that day. I hoped that my team’s efforts took us closer to our goal. If we wound up taking a wrong turn, I’d have to take comfort in the fact that at least we’d learned something important.

Loc:496 Validated learning is not after-the-fact rationalization or a good story designed to hide failure. It is a rigorous method for demonstrating progress when one is embedded in the soil of extreme uncertainty in which startups grow. Validated learning is the process of demonstrating empirically that a team has discovered valuable truths about a startup’s present and future business prospects. It is more concrete, more accurate, and faster than market forecasting or classical business planning. It is the principal antidote to the lethal problem of achieving failure: successfully executing a plan that leads nowhere. > Quite a lot of filler and repetition in these business books..

Loc:503 Those of us involved in the founding of IMVU aspired to be serious strategic thinkers. Each of us had participated in previous ventures that had failed, and we were loath to repeat that experience. Our main concerns in the early days dealt with the following questions: What should we build and for whom? What market could we enter and dominate? How could we build durable value that would not be subject to erosion by competition?

Loc:646 I’ve come to believe that learning is the essential unit of progress for startups. The effort that is not absolutely necessary for learning what customers want can be eliminated. I call this validated learning because it is always demonstrated by positive improvements in the startup’s core metrics. As we’ve seen, it’s easy to kid yourself about what you think customers want. It’s also easy to learn things that are completely irrelevant. Thus, validated learning is backed up by empirical data collected from real customers.

Loc:688 The irony is that it is often easier to raise money or acquire other resources when you have zero revenue, zero customers, and zero traction than when you have a small amount. Zero invites imagination, but small numbers invite questions about whether large numbers will ever materialize. > See: relevant episode in SV!

Loc:705 Thus, we can mitigate the waste that happens because of the audacity of zero with validated learning. What we needed to demonstrate was that our product development efforts were leading us toward massive success without giving in to the temptation to fall back on vanity metrics and “success theater”—the work we do to make ourselves look successful. We could have tried marketing gimmicks, bought a Super Bowl ad, or tried flamboyant public relations (PR) as a way of juicing our gross numbers. That would have given investors the illusion of traction, but only for a short time. Eventually, the fundamentals of the business would win out and the PR bump would pass. Because we would have squandered precious resources on theatrics instead of progress, we would have been in real trouble.

Loc:725 Instead, the way forward is to learn to see every startup in any industry as a grand experiment. The question is not “Can this product be built?” In the modern economy, almost any product that can be imagined can be built. The more pertinent questions are “Should this product be built?” and “Can we build a sustainable business around this set of products and services?” To answer those questions, we need a method for systematically breaking down a business plan into its component parts and testing each part empirically. In other words, we need the scientific method. In the Lean Startup model, every product, every feature, every marketing campaign—everything a startup does—is understood to be an experiment designed to achieve validated learning. This experimental approach works across industries and sectors, as we’ll see in Chapter 4.

Loc:741 A true experiment follows the scientific method. It begins with a clear hypothesis that makes predictions about what is supposed to happen. It then tests those predictions empirically. > Scientific method should probably be: tries to falsify those hypotheses

Loc:757 research. If Zappos had relied on existing market research or conducted a survey, it could have asked what customers thought they wanted. By building a product instead, albeit a simple one, the company learned much more: It had more accurate data about customer demand because it was observing real customer behavior, not asking hypothetical questions. It put itself in a position to interact with real customers and learn about their needs. For example, the business plan might call for discounted pricing, but how are customer perceptions of the product affected by the discounting strategy? It allowed itself to be surprised when customers behaved in unexpected ways, revealing information Zappos might not have known to ask about. For example, what if customers returned the shoes?

Loc:824 Put another way, what if all ten early adopters decline to volunteer again? That would be a highly significant—and very negative—result. If the numbers from such early experiments don’t look promising, there is clearly a problem with the strategy. That doesn’t mean it’s time to give up; on the contrary, it means it’s time to get some immediate qualitative feedback about how to improve the program. Here’s where this kind of experimentation has an advantage over traditional market research. We don’t have to commission a survey or find new people to interview. We already have a cohort of people to talk to as well as knowledge about their actual behavior: the participants in the initial experiment.

Loc:913 My suggestion was drawn straight from the principles of this chapter: treat the CFPB as an experiment, identify the elements of the plan that are assumptions rather than facts, and figure out ways to test them. Using these insights, we could build a minimum viable product and have the agency up and running—on a micro scale—long before the official plan was set in motion.

Loc:922 To start experimenting immediately, the agency could start with the creation of a simple hotline number, using one of the new breed of low-cost and fast setup platforms such as Twilio. With a few hours’ work, they could add simple voice prompts, offering callers a menu of financial problems to choose from. In the first version, the prompts could be drawn straight from the existing research. Instead of a caseworker on the line, each prompt could offer the caller useful information about how to solve her or his problem. Instead of marketing this hotline to the whole country, the agency could run the experiment in a much more limited way: start with a small geographic area, perhaps as small as a few city blocks, and instead of paying for expensive television or radio advertising to let people know about the service, use highly targeted advertising. Flyers on billboards, newspaper advertisements to those blocks, or specially targeted online ads would be a good start. > How sensible

Loc:948 The entrepreneurs and managers profiled in this book are smart, capable, and extremely results-oriented. In many cases, they are in the midst of building an organization in a way consistent with the best practices of current management thinking. > Management-speak paragraph of horror.

Loc:966 Many people have professional training that emphasizes one element of this feedback loop. For engineers, it’s learning to build things as efficiently as possible. Some managers are experts at strategizing and learning at the whiteboard. Plenty of entrepreneurs focus their energies on the individual nouns: having the best product idea or the best-designed initial product or obsessing over data and metrics. The truth is that none of these activities by itself is of paramount importance. Instead, we need to focus our energies on minimizing the total time through this feedback loop.

Loc:1,006 By all accounts, what impressed investors the most were two facts about Facebook’s early growth. The first fact was the raw amount of time Facebook’s active users spent on the site. More than half of the users came back to the site every single day.2 This is an example of how a company can validate its value hypothesis—that customers find the product valuable. The second impressive thing about Facebook’s early traction was the rate at which it had taken over its first few college campuses. The rate of growth was staggering: Facebook launched on February 4, 2004, and by the end of that month almost three-quarters of Harvard’s undergraduates were using it, without a dollar of marketing or advertising having been spent.

Loc:1,101 In my Toyota interviews, when I asked what distinguishes the Toyota Way from other management approaches, the most common first response was genchi gembutsu—whether I was in manufacturing, product development, sales, distribution, or public affairs. You cannot be sure you really understand any part of any business problem unless you go and see for yourself firsthand. It is unacceptable to take anything for granted or to rely on the reports of others.6 To demonstrate, take a look at the development of Toyota’s Sienna minivan for the 2004 model year. At Toyota, the manager responsible for the design and development of a new model is called the chief engineer, a cross-functional leader who oversees the entire process from concept to production. The 2004 Sienna was assigned to Yuji Yokoya, who had very little experience in North America, which was the Sienna’s primary market. To figure out how to improve the minivan, he proposed an audacious entrepreneurial undertaking: a road trip spanning all fifty U.S. states, all thirteen provinces and territories of Canada, and all parts of Mexico. In all, he logged more than 53,000 miles of driving. In small towns and large cities, Yokoya would rent a current-model Sienna, driving it in addition to talking to and observing real customers. From those firsthand observations, Yokoya was able to start testing his critical assumptions about what North American consumers wanted in a minivan.

Loc:1,128 All successful sales models depend on breaking down the monolithic view of organizations into the disparate people that make them up.

Loc:1,129 As Steve Blank has been teaching entrepreneurs for years, the facts that we need to gather about customers, markets, suppliers, and channels exist only “outside the building.” Startups need extensive contact with potential customers to understand them, so get out of your chair and get to know them.

Loc:1,134 he didn’t start with stacks of market research or in-depth analysis at the whiteboard. Instead, he picked up two phone books: one for Palo Alto, California, where he was living at the time, and the other for Winnetka, Illinois. Calling people at random, he inquired if he could ask them a few questions about the way they managed their finances. >See: do things that don’t scale

Loc:1,176 We took a WordPress Blog and we skinned it to say Groupon and then every day we would do a new post. It was totally ghetto. We would sell T-shirts on the first version of Groupon. We’d say in the write-up, “This T-shirt will come in the color red, size large. If you want a different color or size, e-mail that to us.” We didn’t have a form to add that stuff. It was just so cobbled together. It was enough to prove the concept and show that it was something that people really liked. The actual coupon generation that we were doing was all FileMaker. We would run a script that would e-mail the coupon PDF to people. It got to the point where we’d sell 500 sushi coupons in a day, and we’d send 500 PDFs to people with Apple Mail at the same time. Really until July of the first year it was just a scrambling to grab the tiger by the tail. It was trying to catch up and reasonably piece together a product.1 Handmade PDFs, a pizza coupon, and a simple blog were enough to launch Groupon into record-breaking success; it is on pace to become the fastest company in history to achieve $1 billion in sales.

Loc:1,190 Contrary to traditional product development, which usually involves a long, thoughtful incubation period and strives for product perfection, the goal of the MVP is to begin the process of learning, not end it. Unlike a prototype or concept test, an MVP is designed not just to answer product design or technical questions. Its goal is to test fundamental business hypotheses. > Questionnaires was an MVP, but we learnt nothing from it

Loc:1,263 Today, Dropbox is one of Silicon Valley’s hottest companies, rumored to be worth more than $1 billion. > Rumored to be worth..hah

Loc:1,303 Only at the point where the founders were too busy to bring on additional customers did Manuel and his team start to invest in automation in the form of product development. Each iteration of their minimum viable product allowed them to save a little more time and serve a few more customers: delivering the recipes and shopping list via e-mail instead of via an in-home visit, starting to parse lists of what was on sale automatically via software instead of by hand, even eventually taking credit card payments online instead of a handwritten check.

Loc:1,341 All the early prototypes failed to engage the customers. As Max describes it, “We self-funded the company and released very cheap prototypes to test. What became Aardvark was the sixth prototype. Each prototype was a two- to four-week effort. We used humans to replicate the back end as much as possible. We invited one hundred to two hundred friends to try the prototypes and measured how many of them came back. The results were unambiguously negative until Aardvark.”

Loc:1,361 In a Wizard of Oz test, customers believe they are interacting with the actual product, but behind the scenes human beings are doing the work. Like the concierge MVP, this approach is incredibly inefficient. > see: early Amazon

Loc:1,375 Most modern business and engineering philosophies focus on producing high-quality experiences for customers as a primary principle; it is the foundation of Six Sigma, lean manufacturing, design thinking, extreme programming, and the software craftsmanship movement. These discussions of quality presuppose that the company already knows what attributes of the product the customer will perceive as worthwhile. In a startup, this is a risky assumption to make. Often we are not even sure who the customer is. Thus, for startups, I believe in the following quality principle: If we do not know who the customer is, we do not know what quality is.

Loc:1,430 In fact, I have often given entrepreneurs fearful of this issue the following assignment: take one of your ideas (one of your lesser insights, perhaps), find the name of the relevant product manager at an established company who has responsibility for that area, and try to get that company to steal your idea. Call them up, write them a memo, send them a press release—go ahead, try it. The truth is that most managers in most companies are already overwhelmed with good ideas. Their challenge lies in prioritization and execution, and it is those challenges that give a startup hope of surviving.10 If a competitor can outexecute a startup once the idea is known, the startup is doomed anyway. The reason to build a new team to pursue an idea is that you believe you can accelerate through the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop faster than anyone else can. If that’s true, it makes no difference what the competition knows. If it’s not true, a startup has much bigger problems, and secrecy won’t fix them.

Loc:1,475 One of the most dangerous outcomes for a startup is to bumble along in the land of the living dead. Employees and entrepreneurs tend to be optimistic by nature. We want to keep believing in our ideas even when the writing is on the wall. This is why the myth of perseverance is so dangerous. We all know stories of epic entrepreneurs who managed to pull out a victory when things seemed incredibly bleak. Unfortunately, we don’t hear stories about the countless nameless others who persevered too long, leading their companies to failure.

Loc:1,531 These MVPs provide the first example of a learning milestone. An MVP allows a startup to fill in real baseline data in its growth model—conversion rates, sign-up and trial rates, customer lifetime value, and so on—and this is valuable as the foundation for learning about customers and their reactions to a product even if that foundation begins with extremely bad news.

Loc:1,541 Every product development, marketing, or other initiative that a startup undertakes should be targeted at improving one of the drivers of its growth model. For example, a company might spend time improving the design of its product to make it easier for new customers to use. This presupposes that the activation rate of new customers is a driver of growth and that its baseline is lower than the company would like. To demonstrate validated learning, the design changes must improve the activation rate of new customers. If they do not, the new design should be judged a failure. This is an important rule: a good design is one that changes customer behavior for the better.

Loc:1,546 Compare two startups. The first company sets out with a clear baseline metric, a hypothesis about what will improve that metric, and a set of experiments designed to test that hypothesis. The second team sits around debating what would improve the product, implements several of those changes at once, and celebrates if there is any positive increase in any of the numbers. Which startup is more likely to be doing effective work and achieving lasting results?

Loc:1,568 Five dollars bought us a hundred clicks—every day. From a marketing point of view this was not very significant, but for learning it was priceless. Every single day we were able to measure our product’s performance with a brand new set of customers. Also, each time we revised the product, we got a brand new report card on how we were doing the very next day.

Loc:1,571 For example, one day we would debut a new marketing message aimed at first-time customers. The next day we might change the way new customers were initiated into the product. Other days, we would add new features, fix bugs, roll out a new visual design, or try a new layout for our website. Every time, we told ourselves we were making the product better, but that subjective confidence was put to the acid test of real numbers. Day in and day out we were performing random trials. Each day was a new experiment. Each day’s customers were independent of those of the day before. Most important, even though our gross numbers were growing, it became clear that our funnel metrics were not changing.

Loc:1,768 Although working with split tests seems to be more difficult because it requires extra accounting and metrics to keep track of each variation, it almost always saves tremendous amounts of time in the long run by eliminating work that doesn’t matter to customers.

Loc:1,841 For a report to be considered actionable, it must demonstrate clear cause and effect. Otherwise, it is a vanity metric. The reports that Grockit’s team began to use to judge their learning milestones made it extremely clear what actions would be necessary to replicate the results. By contrast, vanity metrics fail this criterion. Take the number of hits to a company website. Let’s say we have 40,000 hits this month—a new record. What do we need to do to get more hits? Well, that depends. Where are the new hits coming from? Is it from 40,000 new customers or from one guy with an extremely active web browser? Are the hits the result of a new marketing campaign or PR push? What is a hit, anyway? Does each page in the browser count as one hit, or do all the embedded images and multimedia content count as well? Those who have sat in a meeting debating the units of measurement in a report will recognize this problem.

Loc:1,853 Unfortunately, when the numbers go down, it results in a very different reaction: now it’s somebody else’s fault. Thus, most team members or departments live in a world where their department is constantly making things better, only to have their hard work sabotaged by other departments that just don’t get it. Is it any wonder these departments develop their own distinct language, jargon, culture, and defense mechanisms against the bozos working down the hall? Actionable metrics are the antidote to this problem. When cause and effect is clearly understood, people are better able to learn from their actions. Human beings are innately talented learners when given a clear and objective assessment.

Loc:1,865 This is why cohort-based reports are the gold standard of learning metrics: they turn complex actions into people-based reports. Each cohort analysis says: among the people who used our product in this period, here’s how many of them exhibited each of the behaviors we care about. In the IMVU example, we saw four behaviors: downloading the product, logging into the product from one’s computer, engaging in a chat with other customers, and upgrading to the paid version of the product. In other words, the report deals with people and their actions, which are far more useful than piles of data points. For example, think about how hard it would have been to tell if IMVU was being successful if we had reported only on the total number of person-to-person conversations. Let’s say we have 10,000 conversations in a period. Is that good? Is that one person being very, very social, or is it 10,000 people each trying the product one time and then giving up? There’s no way to know without creating a more detailed report.

Loc:2,099 The true measure of runway is how many pivots a startup has left: the number of opportunities it has to make a fundamental change to its business strategy. Measuring runway through the lens of pivots rather than that of time suggests another way to extend that runway: get to each pivot faster. In other words, the startup has to find ways to achieve the same amount of validated learning at lower cost or in a shorter time. All the techniques in the Lean Startup model that have been discussed so far have this as their overarching goal.

Loc:2,145 The decision to pivot is emotionally charged for any startup and has to be addressed in a structured way. One way to mitigate this challenge is to schedule the meeting in advance. I recommend that every startup have a regular “pivot or persevere” meeting. In my experience, less than a few weeks between meetings is too often and more than a few months is too infrequent. However, each startup needs to find its own pace.

Loc:2,267 Zoom-in Pivot In this case, what previously was considered a single feature in a product becomes the whole product. This is the type of pivot Votizen made when it pivoted away from a full social network and toward a simple voter contact product.

Loc:2,270 Zoom-out Pivot In the reverse situation, sometimes a single feature is insufficient to support a whole product. In this type of pivot, what was considered the whole product becomes a single feature of a much larger product.

Loc:2,272 Customer Segment Pivot In this pivot, the company realizes that the product it is building solves a real problem for real customers but that they are not the type of customers it originally planned to serve. In other words, the product hypothesis is partially confirmed, solving the right problem, but for a different customer than originally anticipated.

Loc:2,275 Customer Need Pivot As a result of getting to know customers extremely well, it sometimes becomes clear that the problem we’re trying to solve for them is not very important. However, because of this customer intimacy, we often discover other related problems that are important and can be solved by our team.

Loc:2,282 Platform Pivot A platform pivot refers to a change from an application to a platform or vice versa. Most commonly, startups that aspire to create a new platform begin life by selling a single application, the so-called killer app, for their platform.

Loc:2,286 Business Architecture Pivot This pivot borrows a concept from Geoffrey Moore, who observed that companies generally follow one of two major business architectures: high margin, low volume (complex systems model) or low margin, high volume (volume operations model).6 The former commonly is associated with business to business (B2B) or enterprise sales cycles, and the latter with consumer products

Loc:2,292 Value Capture Pivot There are many ways to capture the value a company creates. These methods are referred to commonly as monetization or revenue models. These terms are much too limiting. Implicit in the idea of monetization is that it is a separate “feature” of a product that can be added or removed at will. In reality, capturing value is an intrinsic part of the product hypothesis. Often, changes to the way a company captures value can have far-reaching consequences for the rest of the business, product, and marketing strategies.

Loc:2,296 Engine of Growth Pivot As we’ll see in Chapter 10, there are three primary engines of growth that power startups: the viral, sticky, and paid growth models. In this type of pivot, a company changes its growth strategy to seek faster or more profitable growth. Commonly but not always, the engine of growth also requires a change in the way value is captured.

Loc:2,299 Channel Pivot In traditional sales terminology, the mechanism by which a company delivers its product to customers is called the sales channel or distribution channel. For example, consumer packaged goods are sold in a grocery store, cars are sold in dealerships, and much enterprise software is sold (with extensive customization) by consulting and professional services firms. Often, the requirements of the channel determine the price, features, and competitive landscape of a product. A channel pivot is a recognition that the same basic solution could be delivered through a different channel with greater effectiveness. Whenever a company abandons a previously complex sales process to “sell direct” to its end users, a channel pivot is in progress.

Loc:2,328 A pivot is not just an exhortation to change. Remember, it is a special kind of structured change designed to test a new fundamental hypothesis about the product, business model, and engine of growth. It is the heart of the Lean Startup method. It is what makes the companies that follow Lean Startup resilient in the face of mistakes: if we take a wrong turn, we have the tools we need to realize it and the agility to find another path.

Loc:2,389 Why does stuffing one envelope at a time get the job done faster even though it seems like it would be slower? Because our intuition doesn’t take into account the extra time required to sort, stack, and move around the large piles of half-complete envelopes when it’s done the other way.2 It seems more efficient to repeat the same task over and over, in part because we expect that we will get better at this simple task the more we do it. Unfortunately, in process-oriented work like this, individual performance is not nearly as important as the overall performance of the system. Even if the amount of time that each process took was exactly the same, the small batch production approach still would be superior, and for even more counterintuitive reasons. For example, imagine that the letters didn’t fit in the envelopes. With the large-batch approach, we wouldn’t find that out until nearly the end. >Yes!

Loc:2,396 What if the envelopes are defective and won’t seal? In the large-batch approach, we’d have to unstuff all the envelopes, get new ones, and restuff them. In the small-batch approach, we’d find this out immediately and have no rework required.

Loc:2,422 The biggest advantage of working in small batches is that quality problems can be identified much sooner. This is the origin of Toyota’s famous andon cord, which allows any worker to ask for help as soon as they notice any problem, such as a defect in a physical part, stopping the entire production line if it cannot be corrected immediately. This is another very counterintuitive practice. An assembly line works best when it is functioning smoothly, rolling car after car off the end of the line. The andon cord can interrupt this careful flow as the line is halted repeatedly. However, the benefits of finding and fixing problems faster outweigh this cost. This process of continuously driving out defects has been a win-win for Toyota and its customers. It is the root cause of Toyota’s historic high quality ratings and low costs.

Loc:2,461 Going back to our business-to-hobby example of the missing checkout button, let’s make the problem a little more interesting. Imagine that instead of removing the button altogether, an engineer makes a mistake and changes the button’s color so that it is now white on a white background. From the point of view of automated functional tests, the button is still there and everything is working normally; from the customer’s point of view, the button is gone, and so nobody can buy anything. This class of problems is hard to detect solely with automation but is still catastrophic from a business point of view. At IMVU, our immune system is programmed to detect these business consequences and automatically invoke our equivalent of the andon cord. When our immune system detects a problem, a number of things happen immediately: The defective change is removed immediately and automatically. Everyone on the relevant team is notified of the problem. The team is blocked from introducing any further changes, preventing the problem from being compounded by future mistakes … … until the root cause of the problem is found and fixed. (This root cause analysis is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 11.) At IMVU, we called this continuous deployment, and even in the fast-moving world of software development it is still considered controversial.

Loc:2,549 Imagine you’re a product designer overseeing a new product and you need to produce thirty individual design drawings. It probably seems that the most efficient way to work is in seclusion, by yourself, producing the designs one by one. Then, when you’re done with all of them, you pass the drawings on to the engineering team and let them work. In other words, you work in large batches. From the point of view of individual efficiency, working in large batches makes sense. It also has other benefits: it promotes skill building, makes it easier to hold individual contributors accountable, and, most important, allows experts to work without interruption. At least that’s the theory. Unfortunately, reality seldom works out that way. Consider our hypothetical example. After passing thirty design drawings to engineering, the designer is free to turn his or her attention to the next project. But remember the problems that came up during the envelope-stuffing exercise. What happens when engineering has questions about how the drawings are supposed to work? What if some of the drawings are unclear? What if something goes wrong when engineering attempts to use the drawings? These problems inevitably turn into interruptions for the designer, and now those interruptions are interfering with the next large batch the designer is supposed to be working on. If the drawings need to be redone, the engineers may become idle while they wait for the rework to be completed. If the designer is not available, the engineers may have to redo the designs themselves. This is why so few products are actually built the way they are designed. > Speed up release loop, do tickets one by one, complete fully before taking the next

Loc:2,596 Lean production solves the problem of stockouts with a technique called pull. When you bring a car into the dealership for repair, one blue 2011 Camry bumper gets used. This creates a “hole” in the dealer’s inventory, which automatically causes a signal to be sent to a local restocking facility called the Toyota Parts Distribution Center (PDC). The PDC sends the dealer a new bumper, which creates another hole in inventory. This sends a similar signal to a regional warehouse called the Toyota Parts Redistribution Center (PRC), where all parts suppliers ship their products. That warehouse signals the factory where the bumpers are made to produce one more bumper, which is manufactured and shipped to the PRC. The ideal goal is to achieve small batches all the way down to single-piece flow along the entire supply chain. Each step in the line pulls the parts it needs from the previous step. This is the famous Toyota just-in-time production method. > Impressive

Loc:2,606 Startups struggle to see their work-in-progress inventory. When factories have excess WIP, it literally piles up on the factory floor. Because most startup work is intangible, it’s not nearly as visible. For example, all the work that goes into designing the minimum viable product is—until the moment that product is shipped—just WIP inventory. Incomplete designs, not-yet-validated assumptions, and most business plans are WIP. Almost every Lean Startup technique we’ve discussed so far works its magic in two ways: by converting push methods to pull and reducing batch size. Both have the net effect of reducing WIP.

Loc:2,618 As soon as we formulate a hypothesis that we want to test, the product development team should be engineered to design and run this experiment as quickly as possible, using the smallest batch size that will get the job done. Remember that although we write the feedback loop as Build-Measure-Learn because the activities happen in that order, our planning really works in the reverse order: we figure out what we need to learn and then work backwards to see what product will work as an experiment to get that learning. Thus, it is not the customer, but rather our hypothesis about the customer, that pulls work from product development and other functions. Any other work is waste.

Loc:2,688 Sustainable growth is characterized by one simple rule: New customers come from the actions of past customers. There are four primary ways past customers drive sustainable growth: […] 1. Word of mouth. 2. As a side effect of product usage. Fashion or status, such as luxury goods products, drive awareness of themselves whenever they are used. When you see someone dressed in the latest clothes or driving a certain car, you may be influenced to buy that product. This is also true of so-called viral products such as Facebook and PayPal. When a customer sends money to a friend using PayPal, the friend is exposed automatically to the PayPal product. 3. Through funded advertising. Most businesses employ advertising to entice new customers to use their products. For this to be a source of sustainable growth, the advertising must be paid for out of revenue, not one-time sources such as investment capital. As long as the cost of acquiring a new customer (the so-called marginal cost) is less than the revenue that customer generates (the marginal revenue), the excess (the marginal profit) can be used to acquire more customers. The more marginal profit, the faster the growth. 4. Through repeat purchase or use.

Loc:2,703 These sources of sustainable growth power feedback loops that I have termed engines of growth. Each is like a combustion engine, turning over and over. The faster the loop turns, the faster the company will grow. Each engine has an intrinsic set of metrics that determine how fast a company can grow when using it.

Loc:2,713 “Startups don’t starve; they drown.” There are always a zillion new ideas about how to make the product better floating around, but the hard truth is that most of those ideas make a difference only at the margins. They are mere optimizations. Startups have to focus on the big experiments that lead to validated learning. The engines of growth framework helps them stay focused on the metrics that matter.

Loc:2,743 When PointCast was struggling to grow, it was nonetheless incredibly successful in new customer acquisition—just like this sticky startup (39 percent every period). Unfortunately, this growth is being offset by an equivalent amount of churn. Once it is modeled this way, the good news should be apparent: there are plenty of new customers coming in the door. The way to find growth is to focus on existing customers for the product even more engaging to them.

Loc:2,776 Companies that rely on the viral engine of growth must focus on increasing the viral coefficient more than anything else, because even tiny changes in this number will cause dramatic changes in their future prospects.

Loc:2,809 Suppose an advertisement costs $100 and causes fifty new customers to sign up for the service. This ad has a cost per acquisition (CPA) of $2.00. In this example, if the product has an LTV that is greater than $2, the product will grow. The margin between the LTV and the CPA determines how fast the paid engine of growth will turn (this is called the marginal profit). Conversely, if the CPA remains at $2.00 but the LTV falls below $2.00, the company’s growth will slow. It may make up the difference with one-time tactics such as using invested capital or publicity stunts, but those tactics are not sustainable. This was the fate of many failed companies, including notable dot-com flameouts that erroneously believed that they could lose money on each customer but, as the old joke goes, make it up in volume.

Loc:2,831 Over time, any source of customer acquisition will tend to have its CPA bid up by this competition. If everyone in an industry makes the same amount of money on each sale, they all will wind up paying most of their marginal profit to the source of acquisition. Thus, the ability to grow in the long term by using the paid engine requires a differentiated ability to monetize a certain set of customers.

Loc:2,846 Marc Andreessen, the legendary entrepreneur and investor and one of the fathers of the World Wide Web, coined the term product/market fit to describe the moment when a startup finally finds a widespread set of customers that resonate with its product: In a great market—a market with lots of real potential customers—the market pulls product out of the startup. This is the story of search keyword advertising, Internet auctions, and TCP/IP routers. Conversely, in a terrible market, you can have the best product in the world and an absolutely killer team, and it doesn’t matter—you’re going to fail.3 When you see a startup that has found a fit with a large market, it’s exhilarating. It leaves no room for doubt. It is Ford’s Model T flying out of the factory as fast as it could be made, Facebook sweeping college campuses practically overnight, or Lotus taking the business world by storm, selling $54 million worth of Lotus 1-2-3 in its first year of operation.

Loc:3,035 Five Whys is a powerful organizational technique. Some of the engineers I have trained to use it believe that you can derive all the other Lean Startup techniques from the Five Whys. Coupled with working in small batches, it provides the foundation a company needs to respond quickly to problems as they appear, without overinvesting or overengineering.

Loc:3,055 Here’s a situation in which this mantra came in handy. Because of the training process we had developed at IMVU through the Five Whys, we routinely asked new engineers to make a change to the production environment on their first day. For engineers trained in traditional development methods, this was often frightening. They would ask, “What will happen to me if I accidentally disrupt or stop the production process?” In their previous jobs, that was a mistake that could get them fired. At IMVU we told new hires, “If our production process is so fragile that you can break it on your very first day of work, shame on us for making it so easy to do so.” If they did manage to break it, we immediately would have them lead the effort to fix the problem as well as the effort to prevent the next person from repeating their mistake. For new hires who came from companies with a very different culture, this was often a stressful initiation, but everyone came through it with a visceral understanding of our values. Bit by bit, system by system, those small investments added up to a robust product development process that allowed all our employees to work more creatively, with greatly reduced fear.

Loc:3,126 To introduce Five Whys to an organization, it is necessary to hold Five Whys sessions as new problems come up. Since baggage issues are endemic, they naturally come up as part of the Five Whys analysis and you can take that opportunity to fix them incrementally. If they don’t come up organically, maybe they’re not as big as they seem. Everyone who is connected to a problem needs to be at the Five Whys session. Many organizations face the temptation to save time by sparing busy people from the root cause analysis. This is a false economy, as IGN discovered the hard way.

Loc:3,254 Historically, QuickBooks had been built with large teams and long cycle times. For example, in earlier years the ill-fated online banking team had been composed of fifteen engineers, seven quality assurance specialists, a product manager, and at times more than one designer. Now no team is bigger than five people. The focus of each team is iterating with customers as rapidly as possible, running experiments, and then using validated learning to make real-time investment decisions about what to work on. As a result, whereas they used to have five major “branches” of QuickBooks that merged features at the time of the launch, now there are twenty to twenty-five branches. This allows for a much larger set of experiments. Each team works on a new feature for approximately six weeks end to end, testing it with real customers throughout the process.

Loc:3,267 To get the batch size down, the QuickBooks team had to invest in new technology. They built a virtualization system that allowed them to run multiple versions of QuickBooks on a customer’s computer. The second version could access all the customer’s data but could not make permanent changes to it. Thus, there was no risk of the new version corrupting the customer’s data by accident. This allowed them to isolate new releases to allow selected real customers to test them and provide feedback.

Loc:3,297 Internal or external, in my experience startup teams require three structural attributes: scarce but secure resources, independent authority to develop their business, and a personal stake in the outcome. Each of these requirements is different from those of established company divisions. Keep in mind that structure is merely a prerequisite—it does not guarantee success. But getting the structure wrong can lead to almost certain failure.

Loc:3,353 You should be able to spot the many problems with this situation: the use of vanity metrics instead of actionable metrics, an overly long cycle time, the use of large batch sizes, an unclear growth hypothesis, a weak experimental design, a lack of team ownership, and therefore very little learning. Listening in, I assumed this would be the end of the meeting. With no agreed-on facts to help make the decision, I thought nobody would have any basis for making the case for a particular action. I was wrong. Each department simply took whatever interpretation of the data supported its position best and started advocating on its own behalf. Other departments would chime in with alternative interpretations that supported their positions, and so on. In the end, decisions were not made based on data. Instead, the executive running the meeting was forced to base decisions on the most plausible-sounding arguments.

Loc:3,379 Anyone who has been in a multisegment business will recognize that there are many possible solutions to this problem, such as creating tiered feature sets so that different customers are able to purchase different “levels” of the product (as in airline seating) or even supporting different products under separate brand names.

Loc:3,430 Because the innovation team is reporting on its progress by using the system of innovation accounting described in Part Two, anyone who reads those reports is getting an implicit lesson in the power of actionable metrics. This effect is extremely powerful. Even if someone wants to sabotage the innovation team, he or she will have to learn all about actionable metrics and learning milestones to do it.

Loc:3,575 On the other hand, Taylor’s words strike me as completely contemporary. For all of our vaunted efficiency in the making of things, our economy is still incredibly wasteful. This waste comes not from the inefficient organization of work but rather from working on the wrong things—and on an industrial scale. As Peter Drucker said, “There is surely nothing quite so useless as doing with great efficiency what should not be done at all.”

Loc:3,599 participant at one of my workshops came up to me a few months afterward to relate the following story, which I am paraphrasing: “Knowing Lean Startup principles makes me feel like I have superpowers. Even though I’m just a junior employee, when I meet with corporate VPs and GMs in my large company, I ask them simple questions and very quickly help them see how their projects are based on fundamental hypotheses that are testable. In minutes, I can lay out a plan they could follow to scientifically validate their plans before it’s too late. They consistently respond with ‘Wow, you are brilliant. We’ve never thought to apply that level of rigor to our thinking about new products before.’

Loc:3,638 As we’ve seen, too many innovation teams engage in success theater, selectively finding data that support their vision rather than exposing the elements of the vision to true experiments, or, even worse, staying in stealth mode to create a data-free zone for unlimited “experimentation” that is devoid of customer feedback or external accountability of any kind. Anytime a team attempts to demonstrate cause and effect by placing highlights on a graph of gross metrics, it is engaging in pseudoscience. How do we know that the proposed cause and effect is true? Anytime a team attempts to justify its failures by resorting to learning as an excuse, it is engaged in pseudoscience as well.

Loc:3,658 Starting in the late 1880s, Taylor began a program of experimentation to discover the optimal way to cut steel. In the course of that research, which lasted more than twenty-five years, he and his colleagues performed more than twenty thousand individual experiments. What is remarkable about this project is that it had no academic backing, no government R&D budget. Its entire cost was paid by industry out of the immediate profits generated from the higher productivity the experiments enabled. This was only one experimental program to uncover the hidden productivity in just one kind of work. Other scientific management disciples spent years investigating bricklaying, farming, and even shoveling. They were obsessed with learning the truth and were not satisfied with the folk wisdom of crafts-persons or the parables of experts. Can any of us imagine a modern knowledge-work manager with the same level of interest in the methods his or her employees use? How much of our current innovation work is guided by catchphrases that lack a scientific foundation?